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I’LL MAKE HIM AN OFFER HE CAN’T REFUSE: A
PROPOSED MODEL FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
Kevin M. Lemley∗
Aside from theft, contract murder, racketeering, and a score of
other crimes, the mafia functions in a fashion similar to the modern
judicial system. Occasionally, the families go to war (litigation).
Alternatively, the heads of the families arrange formal meetings to
resolve disputes (mediation). And, most commonly, the family heads
give orders concerning smaller disputes (arbitration). Granted, remedies
in the mafia are severe: someone usually ends up beaten or lying next to
Jimmy Hoffa. However, the mafia system of dispute resolution reflects
the American court system. While at times the mafia engages in fullscale war, most often the parties resolve disputes with sit-downs or
decisions from the family heads. While the mafia hardly serves as a
glowing role model, its system of dispute resolution provides valuable
insights for private parties to more efficiently handle their disputes.
This article will discuss alternative dispute resolution in intellectual
property disputes. A conceptual approach will be applied in an effort to
better formulate the parties’ strategies towards litigation or alternative
dispute resolution. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a maturing
area of the law, and its application to intellectual property disputes is
complicated.1 These complications make any analysis difficult to
organize. This article will discuss the underlying components of ADR
and intellectual property disputes in a step-by-step fashion. Part I of this
∗
Kevin M. Lemley; LL.M., Intellectual Property, expected May 2005; J.D., University of Arkansas
at Little Rock School of Law, 2003. The author is of counsel to the law offices of Berry D. Bowen
in Houston, Texas, and can be reached at kevinmlemley@yahoo.com. I would like to thank my
incredible wife and best friend, Jenny Lemley, without whom this article never would have been
written. I would also like to thank Mark A. Lemley and Kelly Browe Olson for their helpful
comments and revisions of previous drafts.
1. See generally Scott H. Blackmand & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709 (1998) (discussing the
development of alternative dispute resolution and its application to intellectual property disputes).
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article discusses intellectual property rights and presents two conceptual
interests underlying these rights. Deciding whether to litigate or pursue
ADR demands a thorough understanding of what legal rights are in
dispute.2 Part II focuses on the remedies available to intellectual
property owners (potential liability to infringers) to effectively ascertain
the “prize” of the dispute. Part III provides background information on
various forms of ADR as well as the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act.3 This section will serve as guidance for later sections, primarily the
proposal in Part V. Part IV analyzes the advantages/risks calculi for
intellectual property owners and infringers in proceeding to trial or
pursuing ADR. Part V presents a sophisticated proposal for dispute
resolution in intellectual property disputes. Part VI discusses the effects
of this proposal. The conceptual approach focusing on the parties’
underlying interests offers a pragmatic solution to the litigation/ADR
dilemma. In this article, one crucial issue concerning intellectual
property disputes emerges: the parties’ interests often align. With this
realization, a system of ADR better serves the parties’ interests and
creates tailored solutions to their complicated disputes.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Intellectual property law seeks to “provide incentives for
innovation . . . by establishing enforceable property rights for the
creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and
original works of expression.”4 Simply put, intellectual property law
grants rights to inventors and innovators so they can profit from their
developments.5 With the ability to profit, intellectual property owners
have an incentive to produce new innovations for society to enjoy.6
Without intellectual property rights, infringers could easily exploit these
new innovations and steal profits from the owners.7 Innovators would
2. See Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED CIR. B.J. 1, 612 (1993) (discussing factors that parties should consider in deciding between ADR and litigation,
as well as indicating which type of ADR to use).
3. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993
(1998).
4. Daniel B. Ravicher & Shani C. Dilloff, Antitrust Scrutiny of Intellectual Property
Exploitation: It Just Don’t Make No Kind of Sense, 8 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 83, 89 (2001-2002)
(citing U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing
of
Intellectual
Property
§
1.0
(April
6,
1995),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited 10/25/03)).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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have no economic incentives to innovate, and society would ultimately
suffer the loss.8
Intellectual property law is divided into four primary areas: patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secret.9 Intellectual property consists of
a bundle of rights held by the owner of the particular intellectual
property asset (IPA).10 Every stick in the bundle grants the intellectual
property owner a specific right with regard to the IPA.11 Each area of
intellectual property consists of its own protocol to determine what
subject matter may receive protection, how the owner may achieve this
protection, and how long the IPA receives protection.12 Additionally,
each area of intellectual property provides legal remedies for
infringement as well as fair use provisions available to the public.13 Like
tangible property, the paramount right that intellectual property vests in
the owner is the right to exclude others from use.14 Intellectual property
is distinguished from tangible property, but each form of intellectual
property is also distinguished from the other forms.15 To understand
these distinctions, one must analyze the bundle of rights each IPA
grants.16
Each area of intellectual property conveys a different set of rights
and extends protection for a different period of time. Copyright law
vests into authors the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution,
creation of derivative works, performance, and display.17 Copyright

8. Id. Imagine if the U.S. never adopted a patent law system. People like Thomas Edison
would likely have spent their lives performing insignificant jobs rather than designing technological
advancements to benefit society.
9. Id. While Ravicher and Dilloff delete trade secrets from the list, trade secrets compare a
prominent area of intellectual property law. Compare Ravicher & Dilloff, supra note 4, with
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, ch. 2 (1994).
10. PERRITT, supra note 9, at 36. A more academic definition describes intellectual property
as containing two primary components: creative expression coupled with public willingness to
recognize the property right. Thus, intellectual property essentially permits a person to own
knowledge. Lori M. Berg, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement & Protection of
Intellectual Property: A Converging View, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 99, 102 (1995).
11. PERRITT, supra note 9, at 36.
12. Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 769, 771 (1997).
13. Id. It is important to note that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2003), and Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003), both expressly provide fair use provisions. Conversely, the
countervailing fair use provisions in patent and trade secret law result as a product of case law rather
than statutory requirement.
14. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 12, at 771-772.
15. PERRITT, supra note 9, at ch. 2.
16. Id.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
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protection spans the life of the author plus 70 years.18 A trademark is
any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof used to
identify one’s goods and distinguish them from those sold by others.19
Trademark law offers protection forever so long as the owner renews the
mark.20 Patents protect inventions that are useful, new, and nonobvious.21 A patent protects the invention for 20 years from the filing of
the patent.22 Trade secrets consist of any secret, valuable information
that can be used in business to gain an actual or potential advantage.23
Trade secret protection lasts indefinitely until competitors or the general
public discovers the secret information.24
A. Value of Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property consists of heavy fixed costs and low marginal
costs.25 Intellectual property requires significant expense to create
because owners must commit substantial amounts of funds and time to
develop each IPA.26 Once created, the owner alone has incurred the
initial investment to develop the IPA, and an infringer can copy the IPA
at a minimum expense. For some IPAs, the marginal cost is so low the
cost is virtually nonexistent.27 Without legal protection, infringers have
the power to free ride the intellectual property, and the owner alone
incurs the substantial fixed costs.28 Absent legal protection, infringers
essentially steal the initial investment of the owner and can sell their
infringing product at the lower marginal cost.29 The owner is forced to
sell at the marginal cost in order to retain any significant market share.30
18. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2001).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (2001).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2001).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2001).
23. Edward T. Ellis & Chungmoon Choi, Protection of Intangible Business Assets: Trade
Secrets in the Age of Federal Computer Legislation, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., July 2002,
at 491, 502-503. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
24. Daniel P. Powell, An Introduction to the Law of Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW. 2125,
2125 (1994).
25. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J.,
Sept. 2000, at 115, 118.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 276 (1996).
30. Id. Professor Perritt has designed excellent equations graphing the costs of the owner, the
pirate, and the free ride problem. While the depth of the equations exceeds the scope of this article,
the equations provide a better understanding of how intellectual property rights protect the owner’s
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Selling at this price, the owner can never recover the heavy fixed costs
of developing the intellectual property.31
Intellectual property law allows the owner, rather than infringers, to
derive economic value from the IPA.32 As evidence of this economic
value, owners currently generate revenue from their IPAs.33 Owners use
intellectual property to secure substantial amounts of borrowed capital.34
Numerous companies receive a substantial amount of investment dollars
based on the companies’ intellectual property rights.35 Moreover, these
companies spend an increasing amount of money each year to obtain
protection for their intellectual property rights.36 Despite their economic
value, IPAs alone do not generate market power. Market power
constitutes the ability to generate profits at higher than competitive
levels for a significant period of time.37 In other words, market power is
the ability to establish prices above the marginal cost.38 The IPA is
merely one component in a production process that comprises several
complementary factors.39
These complementary factors include
manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and labor components.40 The
intellectual property owner must utilize these factors in conjunction with
the IPA to realize the commercial value of the IPA.41
Even with an efficient system to realize commercial value, rarely
can the owner easily value the IPA.42 An IPA has zero value if it is ruled
invalid or if legal protection expires.43 Aside from these extremes,

business interests.
31. Id.
32. See Posner, supra note 25, at 118.
33. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash
Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (2001).
34. See Judith L. Church, Structuring Deals Involving Intellectual Property Assets, 706
PRACTISING L. INST.: PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 199 (2002) (providing a thorough discussion of the use of intellectual property as security
for borrowed capital).
35. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 33, at 13.
36. Id.
37. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS LICENSES
LIABILITIES, app. D, §2.2 (2002).
38. Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 46 (2001).
39. NIMMER, supra note 37, at app. D, §2.3.
40. Id. (complementary factors may also include other intellectual property devices).
41. Id.
42. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 357
(2002).
43. Id.
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pinpointing the value of the IPA is a difficult task.44 The most
fundamental concept regarding value is simply stated: value does not
equal price.45 Price only defines the dollar amount at which the IPA
trades in a market.46 Value defines the utility of the IPA to the buyer
and seller.47 The buyer and seller base the exchange on the distinction
between value and price.48 If the price exceeds the seller’s value and
remains below the buyer’s value, the exchange will occur and both
parties will be better off.49 Price and value share an integral relation.50
Price is the perceived value of the IPA to the respective parties; i.e., it is
the concrete number where the parties commit to the exchange.51 Value
is the range of numbers the parties use to negotiate a price.52
The purpose of this article is not to discuss methods to calculate a
monetary figure for intellectual property rights. However, it is important
for the intellectual property owner to reasonably understand the value of
the disputed IPA.53 A large volume of scholarship is produced
concerning intellectual property, but a very small portion focus on the
actual nature of intellectual property rights.
When considering
alternative dispute resolution for intellectual property adjudication, the
focus should shift backward, to the fundamentals of intellectual property
rights, before proceeding forward to strategic decisions. The owner
must completely understand the rights at stake before deciding whether
to settle, litigate, or enter a form of alternative dispute resolution. For a
patent, the owner has a very limited time to profit solely from the
patent.54 Is it worth more to aggressively protect the patent at all costs or
to seek licensing profits for the remainder of the term? For a trade
secret, time is not an issue, but maintaining the secret is imperative.55 Is
it worth the risk of losing the secret to obtain licensing profits?
Trademarks and copyrights have no time or secrecy considerations for
44. Id.
45. Id. at 358.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 357
(2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. While establishing a monetary figure on intellectual property rights exceeds the scope
of this article, it is relevant to note that Professor Hagelin has developed an intriguing valuation
model for intellectual property rights called the Competitive Advantage Valuation. Id. at 397.
53. Id. at 355.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2001).
55. See Powell, supra note 24, at 2125.
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the initial owner, but the owner must still decide between profiting on
his own or profiting from licensing fees. For each decision, the owner
must evaluate the rights at stake and the potential profitability from
licensing or not.
Likewise, the infringer must completely understand the potential
liability at stake before making the same decisions. What exactly does
the owner want to protect and, more importantly, why does the owner
want to protect it? Is the potential liability worth the potential profits?
The infringer must contemplate the profitability from freely using the
IPA and the profitability if he must pay a licensing fee for use. How can
the infringer utilize the nature of the intellectual property right to obtain
a negotiating advantage? For licensing of a trade secret, the infringer
may be able to secure a lower royalty rate by assuming additional,
creative safeguards to protect the secret. The infringer may obtain the
same advantage on a patent with only a few years left on its term. The
infringer faces a similar multitude of considerations in deciding whether
to litigate or pursue ADR. Like the intellectual property owner, the
infringer must reasonably understand the value of the disputed IPA. To
adequately value the intellectual property rights, both owners and
infringers must understand and analyze the two major interests
comprising intellectual property rights.
B. The Two Major Interests Comprising Intellectual Property Rights
Excluding others from use is the intellectual property owner’s
definitive property right.56 However, this principle provides only a
superficial understanding of the intellectual property owner’s rights. To
fully understand these rights, one must examine the right to exclude in
the context of the intellectual property owner’s interests to exclude. This
article proposes that the right to exclude consists of two interests:
fundamental and adversarial.57 Under the fundamental interest, the
intellectual property owner seeks to derive the value of his IPA. Under
the adversarial interest, the intellectual property owner seeks to exclude

56. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 12, at 771-72.
57. See Doris E. Long, The New Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property: A Workable Balance or a Practitioner’s Nightmare?, 414 PRACTISING L. INST.: PAT.,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP.COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 381, 393 (1995)
(identifying the right to exclude as the right to profit); Jennifer Mills, Notes & Comments,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Intellectual Property Disputes, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 227 (1996) (explaining the value of intellectual property resides in the two facets of
exclusive use and licensing by the owner). This article extends these concepts by compounding the
right to exclude into two interests: the interest to exclude and the interest to profit.
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others from using his IPA. The fundamental and adversarial interests are
not mutually exclusive; often the intellectual property owner will
commit to a hybrid of the two interests.
The right to exclude generally is not divided into the fundamental
and adversarial interests given the complexity and close relationship
between the two. The fundamental interest derives from the adversarial
interest; that is, the owner cannot seek profit without the power to
exclude. Conversely, the adversarial interest may exist in the complete
absence of the fundamental interest. Any given intellectual property
owner may only desire one interest, but another owner may desire a
complicated hybrid of the two interests. Moreover, an owner’s
commitment to each IPA interest will vary, depending on the
circumstances of the situation. For example, an owner will favor the
adversarial interest when a competitor seeks to use the IPA, but the same
owner may favor the fundamental interest when a non-competitor wishes
to enter a licensing agreement.
For a clearer demonstration of these concepts, intellectual property
may be analogized to tangible property, for the same two interests apply
to tangible property.58 Consider an investor trading corporate stocks.
The investor buys and sells stocks in hopes of making a profit. The
investor is wholly committed to the fundamental interest. While the
investor receives certificates for the stocks he buys, he never receives a
physical “thing.” He is not concerned with preventing others from using
his “thing.” Rather, he hopes to make a profit by selling the stocks at a
higher price than he purchased. The investor will sell the stock as soon
as he can receive a high enough price to realize an acceptable profit.
Consider the same investor inheriting a family heirloom, perhaps a
quilt his grandmother sewed. The heirloom is sentimentally priceless to
the investor. The investor is wholly concerned with his adversarial
interest in the quilt. He has no desire to make a profit; he only wishes to
enjoy exclusive possession of the heirloom. In other words, his focus is
to exclude others from taking or using the heirloom. This interest will
never shift; whether a child seeks the quilt for free or an antique dealer
seeks the quilt for millions of dollars. No one can separate the investor
from the quilt, and any negotiation pursuing this objective would prove
fruitless.
58. See Gilbert & Tom, supra note 38, at 44 (at least in the context of antitrust analysis,
intellectual property undergoes a similar analysis as tangible property); Long, supra note 57, at 393
(the right to exclude vested in intellectual property rights is similar to the same rights conferred in
tangible property). Analogizing intellectual property with tangible property is offered for the
purposes of illustrating the fundamental and adversarial interests.
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Consider once again the same investor buying a house. People buy
houses to have a place to live, but houses also serve as profitable
investments. Here, the investor is committed to a hybrid of the
fundamental and adversarial interests. He does not want anyone
entering or using his house without his permission during his use of the
house as a residence. Also, he wants the market value of the house to
increase. At some point in time, he may like to sell the house for a
profit. Early in his ownership of the house, the investor commits to the
adversarial interest. At some later point, the investor shifts to the
fundamental interest when he is ready to sell. At what time this shift
occurs depends on several factors including the investor’s wishes and
market conditions.59
These illustrations present three possible categories of intellectual
property owners: OF, OA, and O. OF represents an intellectual property
owner committed to the fundamental interest. This owner will realize
profits from his own use as well as from licensing fees. OA represents an
intellectual property owner committed to the adversarial interest. This
owner will disregard any profits from licensing fees. O represents an
intellectual property owner committed to a hybrid that approximately
equalizes the two interests. O initially desires to exclude use altogether,
but O may be convinced to allow use for payment under acceptable
terms.
The owner selects his interest commitment based upon one primary
question: how can I maximize the value of my intellectual property? A
number of factors such as market conditions, available resources, and the
circumstances of the current legal dispute can change the answer to this
question. As a result, a change in any number of circumstances may
cause an OA to shift to an OF, or vice versa. The numerous potential
causes of this shift show the changeable nature of an intellectual
property owner’s commitment. This changeable nature of the owner’s
commitment is the primary distinction against the infringer’s
commitment.

59. While the investor’s purchase of a house is an excellent example of the hybrid, a different
consumer may just as easily commit to the fundamental or adversarial interests when purchasing a
house. A retiring couple purchasing their “dream house” will commit to the adversarial interest.
An aggressive consumer seeking to gain huge profits in the real estate market will commit to the
fundamental interest. The relevant point is that any consumer may commit to the fundamental
interest, adversarial interest, or the hybrid for any property at any given time.
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C. Conceptualizing the Two Interests for Intellectual Property
Infringers
The fundamental and adversarial interests apply with equal force to
intellectual property infringers.60 As discussed above, owners exercise
the two interests as components of ownership. Infringers exercise the
interests as components of the privilege to freely use. The privilege to
freely use is similarly divided into the fundamental and adversarial
interests. Under the fundamental interest, the infringer desires the
privilege to freely use the IPA, whether for profit or enjoyment. This
infringer understands the owner has legally protected rights and that
such use will require payments to the owner. Under the adversarial
interest, the infringer expects to freely use the IPA. This infringer
believes the owner either does not have legally protected rights or should
not have such rights. This infringer refuses to pay for use because he
expects just as much right to profit or enjoyment from the IPA as the
owner. An infringer committed to the hybrid will desire free use in
some circumstances but will expect the right to free use in other
circumstances.
While the interests for the infringer are the same as those for the
owner, the motivations behind the infringer’s commitment differ from
the motivations of an owner. An infringer may seek to profit from the
IPA or seek only to freely use the IPA. However, the infringer’s interest
commitment exists independently of whether or not the infringer seeks
to profit from the IPA. Consider an infringer who downloads MP3 files
and subsequently listens to music from his computer or an MP3 player.
The infringer downloads copyrighted music, but he only seeks
enjoyment. He does not attempt to profit financially from the
infringement. This infringer may commit to either the fundamental or
the adversarial interest; that is, he may or may not be willing to pay for
the use. Consider the same infringer who now runs a CD mixing
business. The infringer receives orders from clients and makes
customized CDs from MP3 files. The infringer sells the CDs for a
profit. Now the infringer realizes profits from the infringement.
However, the presence of profits does not affect the infringer’s
commitment. He still may or may not be willing to pay for the use.
Despite the disparity in motivations, infringers fall into three
60. For purposes of this article “infringer” means anyone using an intellectual property device
without permission from the owner. Such actions may constitute fair use or another defense to
infringement. However, for the sake of clarity, this article will broaden the definition for
explanatory purposes of the more critical issues presented.
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categories like owners: NF, NA, and N. NF represents an infringer
committed to the fundamental interest. This infringer desires free use
but understands payment for use will be required. NA represents an
infringer committed to the adversarial interest. This infringer expects
free use and does not intend to pay for the use. N represents an infringer
committed to a hybrid which approximately equalizes the two interests.
N initially expects to use the IPA without payment, but N can be
convinced to pay for use under acceptable terms.
Unlike the intellectual property owner, the infringer is much more
likely to remain fixed to his initial interest commitment. While the
owner’s interest commitment is often determined by asking a business
question, the infringer looks to a question of right and wrong: Do I have
the right to freely use the IPA? Because the infringer selects his
commitment based upon his distinction between right and wrong, it will
take a significant change in circumstances to facilitate a shift in the
infringer’s commitment. The threat of imminent civil or criminal
liability is usually the only factor to cause an infringer to shift his
commitment. The stronger the threat of liability, the more likely the
shift will occur.61 Consequently, the infringer’s commitment is less
changeable than that of the owner.
D. Conceptualizing the Two Interests for Intellectual Property Disputes
Understanding the fundamental and adversarial interests is not a
purely pedagogical concern. Conceptualizing the two interests for
owners and infringers provides the proper insight into the nature of
intellectual property disputes. Combining the two interests and the
hybrid position, nine possible scenarios exist for intellectual property
disputes:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

OF + NF
OF + N
O + NF
O+N
OF + NA
O + NA

61. After its infamous dispute, Napster merged with legitimate music companies to offer legal
music services. Joseph A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of the
Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 92, 103-04 (2002). The
merger presented a drastic change from Napster’s initial legal position. In terms of infringer
interests, Napster shifted its commitment from the adversarial interest to the fundamental interest.
Unfavorable judgments tend to cause such a shift.
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(7) OA + NF
(8) OA + N
(9) OA + NA
Scenarios (1) - (4) present disputes where both parties are either
committed to the fundamental interest or to the hybrid. Scenarios (5) (8) present disputes where one party is committed to the adversarial
interest but the other party is committed to either the fundamental
interest or the hybrid. Scenario (9) presents a dispute where both parties
are committed to the adversarial interest. Additionally, this scenario
encompasses “non-standard”62 intellectual property disputes.
For
instance, consider two parties engaged in a dispute where both parties
claim the right to one patent. Only one party, if any, can obtain the
patent, and the subsequent limitation on the range of the parties’ interests
causes these disputes to feature a dispute presented in Scenario (9).
The nine scenarios, when analyzed through the fundamental and
adversarial interests, allow focus on the nature of the dispute in terms of
each party’s perception of its rights. In other words, one may examine
what the parties want rather than what the law has to offer. Every
intellectual property dispute will fit into one of the nine scenarios. A
typical legal analysis examines disputes in terms of which party is right
or wrong and what solution the law has to offer. The nine scenarios
provide the opportunity to examine disputes in terms of each party’s
committed interest. From the latter examination, the question of which
party is right fades from the forefront. Rather, the question of how to
accommodate each party’s interest takes precedence. To thoroughly
address this question it is crucial to analyze damages in intellectual
property cases. Before transcending the concept of what the law has to
offer, it is imperative to understand what the law has to offer. For the
parties in the dispute, each must become aware of the stakes involved in
litigation.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DAMAGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASES
Both parties to an intellectual property dispute must have full
knowledge of the possible damage awards available. Generally,
intellectual property owners are businessmen. They develop their IPAs
62. A “non-standard” dispute is a distinction solely for the purposes of this article. There is
nothing atypical about these disputes, but the distinction serves the function of categorizing these
disputes with disputes where both parties are committed to the adversarial interest.
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to create a competitive advantage over their competitors. Deciding
whether to litigate or settle is more a business decision than a decision to
enforce legal rights. If the cost of enforcing the rights exceeds or nearly
equals the value of the IPA, the intellectual property owner faces a
difficult decision. The infringer, whether he seeks profit from the IPA or
not, must assess his potential liability for infringement. If the cost of
enforced liability exceeds acceptable levels, the infringer faces a
similarly difficult decision. Therefore, assessing the possible damages
in an intellectual property dispute is a paramount concern for both
parties. Unfortunately, creating this assessment presents a daunting task.
A. Actual Damages and Reasonable Royalty Rates
Damages are similar among trademark, patent, and copyright
infringement claims. Under the Lanham Act, a successful plaintiff in a
trademark infringement case may win actual damages in the form of
plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s profits.63 The defendant’s profits “are
probably the best possible measure of damages available.”64 The Patent
Act allows damages to compensate for the infringement, and this award
must at least amount to a reasonable royalty for the use of the
invention.65 Patent owners most often seek to recover the defendant’s
profits. To win these damages, the patent owner must prove “(1)
demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing capability to exploit the
demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.”66 The
Copyright Act provides damages consisting of the copyright owner’s
actual damages and additional profits enjoyed by the defendant that are
attributable to the infringement.67 Alternatively, plaintiffs in trademark
cases, like those in patent cases, may win damages of a reasonable
royalty rate.68 The reasonable royalty rate is based on hypothetical
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2001). See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007,
1010 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2001). See Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
66. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2003). See Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., L.L.C., 284 F.3d
505, 517 (4th Cir. 2002); E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
68. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 216 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (D. Colo. 2002); A &
H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret, 967 F. Supp. 1457, 1479 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Wright v. United
States, 53 Fed. Cl. 466, 469 (Fed. Cl. 2002).
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negotiations between the parties, had they so negotiated a royalty rate
(licensing fee).69 However, these damages are rarely awarded in
trademark cases.70
Damages in intellectual property disputes are extremely difficult to
calculate.71 Two primary factors contribute to this difficulty. First, all
three intellectual property statutes grant the factfinder wide discretion in
assigning damage awards.72 As a result, a wide range of possible
damages exists, and the final trial verdict is always subject to review on
appeal. Second, damages from infringement share the same intangible
nature as intellectual property.73 In other areas of law, such as contract
disputes and personal injury claims, the plaintiff has concrete proof of
damages. The plaintiff will have the written contract or medical bills to
offer as proof. Intellectual property owners have no such luxury.
Intellectual property owners must base their damage calculations on
circumstantial evidence such as sales trends, marketing expenditures,
and surveys.74
B. Treble/Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees
The Lanham Act allows courts to award treble damages, but such
an award may not constitute a penalty.75 While the statute does not
specifically set a standard for treble damages, most courts award treble
damages based on some variation of willful infringement.76 The
Lanham Act also provides an award of reasonable attorney fees in
69. Wright, 53 Fed. Cl. at 469.
70. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
30:85 (4th ed. 2003) (usually when a royalty was awarded, the case involved an infringer continuing
to use a mark after the license expired).
71. See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374
(10th Cir. 1977); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Gilbert, 269 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1959). See Roy
J. Epstein, The Market Share Rule With Price Erosion: Patent Infringement Lost Profits Damages
After Crystal, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 1 (2003) (Dr. Epstein presents a dynamic economic model for
calculating patent infringement damages by applying price erosion to the market share rule).
72. See discussion supra Section II.A.
73. See discussion supra Section I.A. This article briefly addressed the complexity in
establishing a monetary value on intellectual property rights. Because it is impossible to establish a
precise value on intellectual property, it logically follows that damages from intellectual property
infringement will be equally as difficult to value.
74. See Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983).
75. 15 U.S.C. §1117(a) (2001).
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, at § 30:91. It was anticipated the Supreme Court would
finally clarify this provision in the summer of 2003. However, the Court found no trademark
infringement and thus avoided any discussion on treble or additional damages. Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
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exceptional cases.77 An exceptional case warranting an award of
attorney fees occurs when the trademark infringement is malicious,
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.78 These standards protect trademark
owners from malicious infringement as well as protect innocent
defendants from abusive owners.79 However, courts rarely award
attorney’s fees to successful defendants.80 To win attorney’s fees, the
prevailing party must demonstrate the exceptional nature of a case by
clear and convincing evidence.81 Once the party makes this showing, the
court may award attorney’s fees at its discretion.82
Attorney’s fees are awarded in patent lawsuits similar to trademark
lawsuits. In addition to treble damages, the Patent Act provides that
“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party.”83 While the Patent Act allows an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees, such awards are relatively rare.84
The Copyright Act allows statutory damages up to $150,000 per
infringement for willful infringement.85 The court may, in its discretion,
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States or an officer thereof.86 Unlike the other intellectual
property statutes, the Copyright Act does not limit attorney’s fees
awards to exceptional cases.87 Some courts award attorney’s fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in copyright actions absent unusual circumstances.88
However, a number of courts require prevailing plaintiffs to prove
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2001).
78. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th Cir.
2000); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2000); Blockbuster
Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, at §§ 30:100-01.
80. See id. at § 30:101.
81. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998). See Christopher P.
Bussert, Interpreting the “Exceptional Cases” Provision of Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act:
When an Award of Attorney’s Fees is Appropriate, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1118 (2002) (providing an
extensive analysis of attorney’s fees awards in trademark cases).
82. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d. at 555.
83. LAURENCE H. PRETTY, PATENT LITIGATION § 9:11 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285
(2003)).
84. 3 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 18:53 (2d ed.
2003).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000), declared unconstitutional by Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d. 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Seventh Amendment requires a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages). Congress
is considering legislation to restore federal remedies for copyright infringement. See S. 1191, 108th
Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
87. 2 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 17:6 (2d ed. 2003).
88. Id.
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willful infringement or bad faith by the losing party.89 Alternatively,
some courts award attorney’s fees to successful defendants in an attempt
to deter frivolous and unreasonable lawsuits.90
C. Intangible Awards
Generally, discussions of intellectual property damages end with
monetary damages and injunctions. Just as intellectual property is
intangible, victories in intellectual property disputes yield intangible
awards. While these awards cannot be quantified, they confer benefits
upon the intellectual property owner. When the intellectual property
owner wins the case, he wins legal precedent that strengthens protection
of the IPA. A written judicial opinion exists that establishes the validity
and strength of the IPA. The legal precedent grants the owner leverage
against subsequent infringers. As subsequent infringers emerge, the
precedent conveys increased bargaining power to the owner. Moreover,
the precedent will likely cause subsequent infringers to shift from the
adversarial commitment to the fundamental commitment and become
more willing to enter licensing arrangements. Additionally, publicity
from the trial exposes the IPA to more consumers, many of whom may
not have known about the IPA. In essence, the trial provides advertising
for the owner. As a deterrent factor, publicity from the trial also grants
the owner notoriety. Subsequent infringers know the owner is willing to
play hardball and fully litigate the dispute. This notoriety will prevent
some infringers from infringing altogether and persuade other infringers
from attempting to bluff through litigation procedures.
D. The Perils of Uncertainty
Understanding possible damages is imperative for both parties in
intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property cases do not present
affirmative evidence of actual damages. There are no medical bills or
signed contracts. There is no specificity. Consider a typical personal
injury case where the plaintiff suffers a broken leg. The plaintiff has
medical bills to prove the exact damages, and employment records will
prove the exact amount of lost wages. The plaintiff knows the exact
89. Id. See Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney’s Fee Awards in Federal Copyright
Litigation After Fogerty v. Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often, but the New
Standard Still Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1381, 1394-95 (2000) (providing a
more detailed discussion of this issue).
90. David Moser, Sixth Circuit Generates Guidelines for Awarding Attorney Fees, ENT. L. &
FIN. April 2002, at 3.
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amount to claim, and the defendant knows the actual amount of potential
liability. The parties in intellectual property rarely have the benefit of
written evidence to quantify damages. The parties enter the battle
unsure of the prize. The most glowing example is the classic dispute
over the slogan: “Gatorade is Thirst Aid for That Deep Down Body
Thirst.”
The Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. (Sands) registered several
trademarks covering THIRST-AID and “First Aid for Your Thirst,” in
the 1950s.91 In 1983, The Quaker Oats Co. (Quaker) acquired the
manufacturer of Gatorade.92 Quaker immediately developed a new
marketing campaign centered on the now famous “Gatorade is Thirst
Aid for That Deep Down Body Thirst.”93 Quaker subsequently aired the
first “Gatorade is Thirst Aid” commercials on television in 1984.94
Sands filed suit for trademark infringement in 1984.95 Sands eventually
won almost $43 million (inclusive of prejudgment interest and attorney’s
fees), but the litigation spanned across six years with the final verdict
entered in 1990.96 Quaker appealed and, in 1992, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the prejudgment interest and remanded the case for recalculation
utilizing a reasonable royalty rate.97 On this first remand, Federal
District Court Judge Marshall entered a final award for Sands in the
amount of $26.5 million; the year was 1993.98 However, Quaker
appealed again, and the Seventh Circuit sharply criticized the remanded
verdict.99 Consequently, the case was remanded in part again, and the
appellate procedure consumed another year.100 Finally, in 1995, Judge
Marshall entered the final verdict of nearly $27 million plus various prejudgment and post-judgment interest awards accruing from various
dates.101
In this dispute, the parties engaged in litigation for eleven years –
six years from the complaint to the initial verdict plus five years of
appeals. Both parties watched the total damages range from $26 million
to $43 million. Judge Marshall and the Seventh Circuit disagreed at

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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some point on almost every component of damages – actual damages,
treble damages, and attorney’s fees. These discrepancies occurred
because intellectual property law offers discretion and reasonableness
factors rather than bright-line rules. The absence of a concrete
measurement of damages hinders courts equally or more severely than
the parties. Judges and juries must examine the parties’ arguments, sales
records, marketing expenses, and past contracts with third parties to
determine the proper damages in the dispute. Even after this assessment,
the factfinder must choose whether or not to award treble damages,
statutory damages, or attorney’s fees. The process yields a wide range
of values in which the total damages award may fall.
Admittedly, the Sands, Taylor case is the exception rather than the
rule, and intellectual property law has become more sophisticated in
calculating damages. However, this case does illustrate a number of
crucial points regarding damages for intellectual property cases. First,
without direct tangible evidence such as a contract or medical bills, the
actual damages are impossible to calculate precisely. Not only is this a
problem for judges and juries, it imposes a similar burden on the parties.
The owner cannot precisely calculate the economic loss inflicted upon
the IPA. Likewise, the infringer cannot exactly calculate his potential
liability. Second, intellectual property disputes are highly susceptible to
appeals. Intellectual property law is structured around reasonableness
factors rather than bright-line rules. Thus, the factfinder possesses a
wide range of discretion when deciding the case. Additionally,
intellectual property disputes tend to yield lucrative damage awards.
The combination of discretion to the factfinder and large damage awards
provides losing parties with great incentives to appeal.
Third,
intellectual property disputes easily can consume years in the appellate
process. The final verdict may prove economically unsatisfying to the
winning party. A successful infringer is especially susceptible to an
extremely costly victory given the difficulty for a successful infringer to
win attorney’s fees. Faced with these elements, parties in intellectual
property disputes have incentives to consider entering alternative dispute
resolution in lieu of full-blown litigation.
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III. FORMS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ADR refers to procedures for settling disputes by means other than
litigation.102 ADR primarily consists of two basic forms – arbitration
and mediation.103 Parties may use arbitration, mediation, and other
hybrid forms of dispute resolution to settle their disputes without
proceeding through the trial process.104 In arbitration and mediation the
parties submit the dispute to a neutral third party to resolve the
disagreement.105 Both ADR forms present the twin benefits of more
efficient resolution and lower costs than litigation.106 The parties are
spared the lengthy processes of discovery and motion practice, which
further enhances their cost savings.107 Furthermore, neither arbitrators
nor the parties are bound to precedent like judges; they are free to utilize
common sense when making their decisions.108 Also, the parties may
select arbitrators and mediators with expertise in the field of the
dispute.109
Despite their similarities, several key differences exist between
arbitration and mediation. The most significant difference is the role of
the conducting party.110 The arbitrator is a decision-maker, whereas the
mediator plays the role of settlement-facilitator.111 Thus, arbitration
more resembles a small trial than a negotiation,112 and arbitration retains
the rigidity of litigation.113 Mediation provides the distinct advantage of
allowing the parties to design their own resolution by means of a
102. Adam Epstein, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sport Management and the Sport
Management Curriculum, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 153, 154 (2002).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Tom Grant, Turkey Embraces Arbitration as Step Toward Global Economic Integration,
74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 47 (2002); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 589 (2002).
106. Joshua R. Welsh, Comment, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too
Far?: Enforcing Arbitration Clauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 582
(2002).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Robert L. Ebe, The Nuts and Bolts of Arbitration, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 85, 86-87 (2002).
See http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last visited 10/25/03) (listing available mediators by
their respective areas of expertise for the parties to choose).
110. Epstein, supra note 102, at 154.
111. Id.
112. Hayden R. Brainard, Survey and Study of Technology Development and Transfer Needs in
New York, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 445 (1999).
113. Id.
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mutually agreed-upon solution.114 The mediator serves as a translator,
guiding the parties to reach an agreement.115 The mediator expands the
parties’ available resources by providing an understanding of the
complicated issues at hand as well as an unemotional analysis of the
underlying problem.116 Mediation deflects the focus of the dispute away
from rights, winners, and losers.117 Instead, mediation focuses on the
parties’ interests and mutual gains.118 As a result, mediation gives the
parties an opportunity to reinforce their relationships with one
another.119 Parties in mediation may strengthen relationships of trust and
respect or terminate the relationship altogether in a manner that
minimizes mental anguish as well as monetary costs.120
Mediation serves as the predominantly beneficial form of ADR for
intellectual property disputes. In Section I, this article presented the
fundamental and adversarial interests governing intellectual property
disputes. The true nature of intellectual property disputes lies in each
party’s interest commitment. Because mediation focuses on the parties’
interests, it is best tailored to handle intellectual property disputes.121
Mediation focuses on each party’s interest commitment to assist the
parties in creating a mutually beneficial agreement.122 Stated differently,
mediation focuses on the parties’ interests to resolve the dispute rather
than declare a winner.123 Mediation thus overcomes the shortfalls of
arbitration. Mediation allows the parties to design a mutually beneficial
solution, whereas arbitration only provides a more efficient means of
declaring a winner.124 Mediation provides a platform where both the
owner and infringer may satisfy their interest commitment to some
extent. While mediation better serves intellectual property disputes, it is
necessary to analyze a hybrid form of mediation and arbitration.

114. HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH E. POWERS, IP STRATEGY: COMPLETE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, ACCESS AND PROTECTION § 5:26 (2003).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Danny Ciraco, Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners, 9 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 47, 60 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at
Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 557 (2002).
120. Id.
121. But see discussion infra Section V for the interrelation of mediation, arb-med, and
arbitration for each of the nine scenarios.
122. See Ciraco, supra note 117, at 60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 63.
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A. Arb-Med/Med-Arb
Mediation-Arbitration (med-arb) is a hybrid form of mediation and
arbitration.125 Parties most often use med-arb when the dispute is
complex and involves numerous issues.126 Under med-arb, the parties
attempt to resolve the dispute first during a mediation phase.127 After
mediation, the parties submit unresolved issues to arbitration.128
Sometimes the mediator also serves as the arbitrator, but this dual role is
often unwise for obvious reasons.129 Arb-med is the same hybrid as
med-arb, but arbitration precedes mediation.130 In arb-med, the parties
first enter a conventional arbitration.131 The arbitrator renders a
decision, but the decision is placed in a sealed envelope.132 Neither
party knows the substance of the decision, only that a decision has been
made.133 Then the parties proceed to a conventional mediation.134 If the
parties resolve the dispute in mediation, the resolution ends the matter.135
If a superceded arbitration decision is disclosed after the mediation, one
of the parties may become frustrated.136 However, the parties have the
contractual power to specify disclosure of the decision prior to
mediation.137 If the parties fail to reach an agreement in the mediation,
the initial arbitration award decides the dispute.138
Arb-med and med-arb are both recognized forms of ADR.
However, med-arb possesses a striking weakness that does not foster
agreement. The major point of mediation is to foster communication
between the parties so they can reach an agreement. In med-arb, a
binding arbitration will follow the mediation if the parties fail to reach
an agreement.139 Therefore, the parties will likely hold back vital
125. Epstein, supra note 102, at 160.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
915, 929 (2001).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Sometimes, the neutral party begins working with the parties as a mediator but at
some point becomes an arbitrator. This model is much weaker for a number of reasons, primarily
due to the arbitrary transition from an arbitration to a mediation. See Cerminara, supra note 119, at
561.
135. Huber, supra note 131, at 929.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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information during the mediation in case the dispute goes to arbitration.
In mediation, the parties are free to walk away for any reason. Med-arb
deprives the parties of this freedom. Parties willing to freely talk in a
true mediation will take a more conservative approach than during the
mediation phase of a med-arb. The threat of entering a subsequent
arbitration prevents the parties from openly seeking a solution. The
subsequent arbitration hinders the mediation from providing an
agreement. Parties who would reach an agreement in a true mediation
may reach an impasse during the mediation phase of med-arb.
Arb-med deprives the parties of the freedom to freely walk away
but generates the opposite result. The parties first fight out the dispute in
arbitration. The decision is entered, and nothing will change it. In the
mediation phase, the parties may talk freely. They can try to work out
an agreement or gamble that the arbitration decision is favorable. Parties
willing to talk freely in a true mediation will take the same approach
during the mediation phase of arb-med. But, parties unwilling to talk
freely in a true mediation now have a greater incentive to do so in the
mediation phase of arb-med. With an arbitration decision already
entered, the parties have nothing to lose by trying to reach an agreement.
Consequently, arb-med fosters agreement between the parties better than
med-arb.
B. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
In 1998, Congress enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
(ADRA).140
The ADRA requires each federal district court to
implement an ADR program and specifically authorizes courts to
compel civil litigants into mediation.141 The ADRA allows the district
courts substantial flexibility and discretion in designing their ADR
programs.142 Courts have the ability to determine the extent of the
program, what ADR forms to use, and what disputes are subject to the
program.143 Along with the ADRA, a variety of public and private
forces have attempted to nudge civil litigants into ADR procedures in
the early stages of their lawsuits.144 Mandatory ADR programs force
civil litigants to make serious choices about settlement early in their
140. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2000). See Holly A.
Streeter-Schaefer, Notes, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 367, 372
(2001).
141. Mark R. Anderson, Settle or Roll the Dice?, 28 LITIG. 37, 39 (2001).
142. Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 140, at 373.
143. Id.
144. Anderson, supra note 141, at 38.
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lawsuits.145 The logic behind this initiative is straightforward: when the
parties seek settlement before incurring large litigation costs, they are
more likely to work out an agreement than war-torn, ego-bruised
litigants.146
In 1996, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
implemented The Lanham Act Mediation Program (Program).147 The
Program was specifically designed to provide mediation services for
trademark disputes.148 Under the Program, all cases are assigned to the
Program, but individual parties may choose whether or not to
participate.149 The response from the Program was overwhelming; most
participating lawyers rated the Program exceptionally high and stated
they would use the Program again. The Program has effectively
achieved a 65-72 percent resolution rate of all disputes submitted to
mediation.150 This figure warrants mentioning again: in two-thirds of all
disputes submitted to mediation, the parties reached an agreement.151
The Program serves as the best evidence of mediation’s strength in
fostering mutual agreements in intellectual property disputes.152 If
mediation can provide agreements in roughly two-thirds of all submitted
disputes, parties should consider submitting the dispute to mediation
rather than litigation.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES/RISKS CALCULUS FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
Parties in intellectual property disputes must base their decisions to
litigate or mediate upon the advantages/risks calculus between the two
options. The calculus is complex, and an exhaustive documentation
would span across numerous volumes of text. This article will discuss
some of the major advantages and risks of litigation153 as well as the
145. Id.
146. Id. The American Intellectual Property Law Association is following the trend of
promoting ADR in intellectual property disputes. See http://www.aipla.org/committees/reports/pdf_
rpts/adr.pdf (last visited 10/25/03).
147. Jennifer Shack & Susan M. Yates, Mediating Lanham Act Cases: The Role of Empirical
Evaluation, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 287, 288 (2002). For more information on the Program, see
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last visited 10/25/02).
148. Shack & Yates, supra note 147, at 288.
149. Id. at 289.
150. Id. at 300.
151. Id.
152. But see discussion infra Section V for the interrelation of mediation, arb-med, and
arbitration for each of the nine scenarios.
153. While it is understood “litigation” encompasses motion practice and ADR procedures,
“litigation” in this article will refer to the parties proceeding to trial.
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advantages and risks of mediation.154 While the calculus is not an exact
science, it is a substantive evaluation that intellectual property owners
and infringers must consider. Attorneys must be ready to accurately
evaluate the client’s advantages/risks calculus to decide the appropriate
tactics in resolving the dispute.155 Any serious pursuit of mediation
presents a question of risk management.156 The lawyer best serves the
client by strategically analyzing the advantages/risks calculus and by
providing complete information and options.157 Consequently, the
lawyer must analyze the calculus the moment a dispute arises.158
Intellectual property disputes impose great expense on the parties
through burdensome discovery processes, particularly in high-tech
disputes.159 Additionally, intellectual property disputes are often
incredibly time sensitive.160 Moreover, intellectual property disputes
often consist of complex facts and involve a significant degree of
technical know-how.161 Delay in evaluating the calculus may prove
costly.
A. Advantages/Risks Calculus for Intellectual Property Owners
Intellectual property owners must examine the calculus along with
their interest commitment and potential damage awards in the particular
dispute. While the calculus is necessary to evaluate the decision to
litigate or mediate, the calculus will provide no definitive answers. It is
not an equation where the owner can plug in a set of values and receive a
yes or no decision. But, the attorney and owner working together should
be able to formulate an effective strategy based on the advantages and
risks of proceeding to litigation or mediation.
1. The Advantages of Litigation
Litigation offers the intellectual property owner several advantages
over ADR. First, the owner may potentially win the full damages sought
154. While this article focuses on mediation, the true calculus would apply to all forms of
ADR.
155. Anderson, supra note 141, at 39.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Miles J. Alexander, Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes: When is it Better to
Switch than Fight?, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., Nov. 1992, at 1, 3.
159. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 52.
160. Id. Patent disputes and technological copyright disputes are especially susceptible to time
limitations given the short duration of patent rights and the rapid advance of technology.
161. Id.
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in the complaint. Second, in addition to full damages, the intellectual
property owner may win treble or statutory damages as well as
attorney’s fees for the dispute. Third, a victory at trial will strengthen
protection of the IPA. Fourth, the intellectual property owner will have
a written statement detailing the reasons for his victory. Finally, a
victory at trial will establish legal precedent for future disputes.
2. The Risks of Litigation
Despite its large potential rewards, litigation imposes a number of
significant risks on the owner. One of the major issues facing
intellectual property owners is the cost of enforcing their intellectual
property rights.162 Intellectual property litigation typically spans several
years with total costs commonly exceeding hundreds of thousands or
even millions of dollars.163 A 2001 survey of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA) calculated the average cost through
trial of typical patent disputes (those disputes between $1 and $25
million at risk) at $1,499,000; $699,000 for similar trade secret disputes;
$502,000 for trademark disputes; and $400,000 for copyright disputes.164
The highly competitive nature of litigation encourages the parties to
exaggerate their claims and thus drive up the costs of litigation.165 These
exaggerated positions ignite the costs of seeking the “truth” when both
parties have expanded the bounds of the dispute.166 Additionally, the
court system establishes a great quantum of merit upon evidentiary
procedure, witness credibility, and burdens of proof.167 The result is a
painstaking process surrounded by opportunities for delay.168 With the
exorbitant costs and huge potential damages in intellectual property
cases, the losing party often appeals, which further adds to the costs and
duration of the dispute.169
162. Stephen Y. Chow, Strategic Alliances: Intellectual Property, 1063 PRACTISING L. INST.:
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 273, 285 (1998).
163. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 68.
164. FETZER-KRAUS, INC., AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001 84-90 (2001) (noting
that when more than $25 million dollars is at risk, the average litigation costs reach $2.99 million
for patent disputes, $1.00 million for trademark disputes, $750 thousand for copyright disputes, and
$1.01 million for trade secret disputes. See Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 546 F.2d 297,
301 (9th Cir. 1976) (allowing attorney’s fees of $237,062.50 for 18,525 hours spread out over 10
years of litigation).
165. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 68.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 69.
168. Id.
169. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1992).
The last sentence of the opening paragraph of the opinion reads, “Not surprisingly, Quaker appeals,”
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While over 90 percent of cases do not proceed to trial,170 parties
still incur substantial costs from the time of filing the claim through
discovery.171 These costs diminish the value of 11th hour settlements.172
Clearly, parties gain more value from settlements early in the litigation
than from 11th hour settlements where the parties have already incurred
substantial litigation expenses.173 Even a high settlement agreement on
the eve of trial may confer less economic value to the owner than a
lesser settlement earlier in the litigation process.174 With these factors,
litigation may offer a bittersweet victory, even for successful litigants.175
Proceeding to trial is a huge gamble.176 “This realization is driven home
when you are waiting for the jury to return a verdict or a judge to
announce a decision. At that moment, it is crystal clear the outcome can
go either way and you might lose.”177 Once the judge or jury has
deliberated to make the decision, the owner truly realizes his lack of say
in the final decision.178 While facing these perils of litigation, owners
must evaluate the option of submitting the dispute to mediation.
3. The Advantages of Mediation
The mediation process is designed to alleviate the massive risks
associated with litigation. Mediation offers substantial cost savings over
litigation.179 Mediation often saves about eighty percent of the total
costs of litigation.180 Litigation grants an advantage to parties with
significant financial resources, but mediation allows parties of lesser
financial means an equal opportunity to effectively voice their
after the district court found Quaker liable for nearly $43 million, including prejudgment interest
and attorney’s fees. Id.
170. Alexander, supra note 158, at 9.
171. See generally FETZER-KRAUS, supra note 164.
172. Anderson, supra note 141, at 39-40.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 40.
175. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Settling Disputes Without Litigation, 34 MD. B.J. 2, 8 (2001).
176. Id.
177. Id. Ms. Eveleth quotes the Honorable Howard S. Chasanow, recently of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. Ms. Eveleth offers no citation; it is assumed Judge Chasanow’s comments
came from informal conversation.
178. See id.
179. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 70. One prominent attorney involved in a multi-defendant
securities fraud claim negotiated a settlement for his client. The other defendants remained in the
litigation before reaching a final judgment ten years later. The decision to settle spared the client
ten years of litigation as well as fees. While this scenario involved a settlement, mediation would
have achieved a similar result. Anderson, supra note 141, at 38. See Peter H. Kaskell, Is Your
Infringement Dispute Suitable for Mediation?, 20 ALTERNATIVES 45, 58 (2002).
180. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 70.
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positions.181 Judge Chasanow commented on the benefits of mediation,
“We saved three to five years in time; $100,000s in dollars saved, and
untold emotions by resolving it in this manner.”182 The cost savings are
not limited to financial savings.
Mediation also saves the parties intangible costs. In a trial, the
parties must relive the damaging acts that brought them to trial.183 While
intellectual property plaintiffs do not have a physical tragedy to relive,
mediation does spare them the mental anguish and suffering of an
arduous litigation process.184 Tom Monaghan, the former owner of
Domino’s Pizza, once described the litigation experience as Chinese
water torture.185 After eventually winning the case, Mr. Monaghan
commented, “I cried like I’d never cried before in my life.”186 Along
with the mental anguish, intellectual property disputes utilize a
painstaking discovery process.187 The discovery process forces the
parties to suffer intangible losses in the form of lost time.188 The parties
themselves, as well as key employees, often spend hours in depositions;
the lost time can never be recovered.189
While litigation can consume years, mediation often provides a
resolution within a few hours or days.190 Patent disputes in particular
embrace a paramount importance on time.191 Otherwise, due to
technological advances, the patent may become invalid even before
resolution of the dispute.192 While trademark, copyright, and trade secret
disputes lack this resolve-before-it-is-obsolete element, there is still a
need for a speedy resolution.193 Intellectual property disputes demand
181. Id. See Eveleth, supra note 175, at 3 (giving the following example: in the summer of
2000, a personal injury case settled for $2.6 million even though the plaintiff never filed a lawsuit).
182. Eveleth, supra note 175, at 9.
183. Id.
184. Emotional distress is a recognized injury where aggrieved parties may recover monetary
damages in tort. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds,
West 5th ed. 1984). While this article is not suggesting parties should be able to recover damages
for going through litigation, parties must give serious consideration to the mental anguish involved
in the litigation process.
185. Alexander, supra note 158, at 6.
186. Id.
187. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 69.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Carmen Collar Fernandez & Jerry Spolter, International Intellectual Property Dispute
Resolution: Is Mediation a Sleeping Giant?, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 63 (1998). Furthermore, the
party seeking mediation early in the dispute shows strength rather than weakness. The party with
the weaker case has the harder time in mediation. Anderson, supra note 141, at 39.
191. Ciraco, supra note 117, at 52.
192. Id.
193. See Fernandez & Spolter, supra note 190, at 63.
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swift resolution so the parties can focus their energies back on making
money rather than financing litigation.194 However, swift resolution
cannot come at the sacrifice of confidentiality.195 Confidentiality is
often crucial in intellectual property disputes.196 Mediation guarantees
the parties privacy and confidentiality.197 Arguably, confidentiality is
the most important advantage mediation offers.198 Confidentiality plays
an even more important role in trade secret disputes where the value of
the trade secret derives from the secrecy of the IPA.199 Not surprisingly,
confidentiality is probably the most frequently discussed issue in
mediation.200 Along with confidentiality, the parties in intellectual
property disputes seek expertise in the factfinder to deal with complex
issues.201 Mediation offers this expertise by the mediator, expertise that
juries and judges often lack.202 By providing the necessary expertise,
mediation saves the parties additional time and effort, as well as
providing more equitable results.203
4. The Risks of Mediation
Mediation does present its own set of disadvantages for the
intellectual property owner. First, the negotiated settlement will likely
fall short of a possible trial award. Second, mediation eliminates the
chances of winning treble/statutory damages or attorney’s fees. Third,
there is an uncertainty as to when to mediate (as opposed to trial which
sets out a schedule). Finally, there is no way to impeach parties at trial
with false statements made in mediation.204 In other words, the
194. Id.
195. See Mills, supra note 55, at 227.
196. Id. at 231.
197. Christine Lepera & Jeannie Costello, Benefits of Mediating Intellectual Property and
Entertainment-Related Disputes, 605 PRACTISING L. INST.: LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 621, 623 (1999).
198. Kaskell, supra note 179, at 60.
199. Nancy Neal Yeend & Cathy E. Rincon, ADR and Intellectual Property: A Prudent
Option, 36 IDEA 601, 605 (1996).
200. Joseph A. Torregrossa, Appellate Mediation in the Third Circuit–Program Operations:
Nuts, Bolts and Practice Tips, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1059, 1075 (2002).
201. Brainard, supra note 112, at 449.
202. Id. at 450. See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court
Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA
J.L. & TECH. 1 (discussing the difficulty facing judges and juries to understand technical
complexities in internet and high technology cases).
203. Mills, supra note 57, at 227-28.
204. Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with Their Statements During Negotiation:
Demysticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege
Statutes, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1037, 1044-1045 (2000).
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intellectual property owner may rely on false information in the
mediation.205
With these considerations, the intellectual property owner’s
calculus takes form. The calculus consists of four components, the
advantages and disadvantages of both proceeding to trial and pursuing
mediation. The advantages of proceeding to trial are:
(1) Possibility of winning full damages,
(2) Possibility of winning treble/statutory damages,
(3) Possibility of winning attorney’s fees,
(4) Strengthen the IPA,
(5) Establish legal precedent, and
(6) Intangible awards.
Conversely, the disadvantages of proceeding to trial are:
(1) Possibility of an outright loss,
(2) Weaken or invalidate the IPA,
(3) Insufficient damages award,
(4) Long trial,
(5) Long appellate process,
(6) Possibility of not winning (or not qualifying for) treble/statutory
damages,
(7) Possibility of not winning (or not qualifying for) attorney’s fees,
(8) Mental anguish/suffering,
(9) No voice in the final decision,
(10) Massive litigation costs,
(11) 11th hour settlements,
(12) Intangible losses,
(13) Probably eliminates future relationships,
(14) Issues turn on credibility of witnesses,
(15) Decision-maker lacks technical expertise, and
(16) Bad publicity.
Whereas, the advantages of mediation are:
(1) Have a voice in the final solution,
(2) Cost beneficial,
(3) Avoid 11th hour settlements,
205. Id.
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(4) Work with the opposing party to establish a licensing fee,
(5) Guaranteed to strengthen the IPA,
(6) Minimize intangible losses,
(7) Minimize mental anguish/suffering,
(8) Time sensitive,
(9) Promote future relationships (if desired),
(10) Issues do not turn on witness credibility,
(11) Technical expertise in decision-makers, and
(12) Confidentiality of the final agreement.
Finally, the disadvantages of mediation are:
(1) Uncertainty as to when to mediate,
(2) No treble/statutory damages,
(3) No attorney’s fees,
(4) Licensing fee may not be as high as trial award,
(5) Cannot use statements made in mediation to impeach the
opposing party at trial, and
(6) Cannot discover damaging evidence from the infringer through
discovery.
As mentioned before, this representation of the advantages/risks
calculus is not exhaustive (an exhaustive list is not feasible). As a
further aside, the quantification of each factor will differ depending on
the owner and the facts of the case.
For example, mental
anguish/suffering will weigh significantly in an individual owner’s
decision. The saved time and trouble of mediation may prove enough
for the individual owner to forego any intention of proceeding to trial.
Stated differently, mental anguish/suffering alone may be sufficient to
shift the individual owner from OA to O or from O to OF. Conversely,
bad publicity is often of no concern to the individual owner. For a large
corporation suing to protect its intellectual property, mental
anguish/suffering will prove a negligible factor. However, bad publicity
will weigh significantly and may be enough on its own merits for the
corporation not to proceed to trial; that is, the pressure of bad publicity
may cause the corporation to shift its interest commitment.
Owners must also apply the calculus to the value of each IPA as
well as the owner’s available complementary factors to realize such
value.
An intellectual property owner with massive marketing,
production, and distribution resources may place greater emphasis on the
advantages of litigation. Such an owner can fully realize the economic
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value of the IPA without outsourcing vital business components. An
owner without these resources may look wholly to the advantages of
mediation to seek means of realizing the IPA’s full economic value.
Complete application of the calculus demands numerous considerations
for the owner in evaluating whether to litigate or mediate. The calculus
is equally complex for infringers.
B. Advantages/Risks Calculus for Intellectual Property Infringers
Intellectual property infringers face a similar calculus as IP owners.
Infringers are presented with the same potential windfalls and perils as
owners. The calculus is the same, with some minor variances. For
instance, damages awards in intellectual property cases function as
advantages for owners but serve as liabilities for infringers. The
substance of the considerations is largely equivocal, and a repeat of the
analysis is not necessary. The advantages of trial for the infringer are:
(1) Potentially win the right to profit from the IPA free of charge,
(2) Potentially diminish the value of or invalidate the IPA,
(3) Potentially establish a fair use provision,
(4) Establish legal precedent, and
(5) Written rationale for the final decision.
The risks of trial for the infringer are:
(1) Possibility of excessive trial court award to the owner,
(2) Possibility of paying treble/statutory damages,
(3) Possibility of paying the owner’s attorney’s fees,206
(4) Massive litigation costs,
(5) Possibility of losing the right to profit from the IPA,
(6) Mental anguish/suffering,
(7) Long trial,
(8) Long appellate process,
(9) No voice in final decision,
(10) Intangible losses,
(11) Probably eliminates future relationships,
(12) 11th hour settlements,
(13) Issues turn on witness credibility, and
206. See supra Section II. If the unsuccessful infringer is forced to pay the owner’s attorney’s
fees, the infringer is essentially forced to pay twice for a losing case. The liable infringer may have
to pay its own costs as well as the owner’s costs.
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(14) Decision-maker lacks technical expertise.
The advantages of mediation for the infringer are:
(1) Guaranteed right to future profits from the IPA,
(2) Have a voice in the final solution,
(3) Cost beneficial,
(4) Eliminates possibility of paying treble/statutory damages,
(5) Eliminates possibility of paying owner’s attorney’s fees,
(6) Avoid 11th hour settlements,
(7) Time sensitive,
(8) Minimize mental anguish/suffering,
(9) Minimize intangible losses, and
(10) Promote ongoing relationship (if desired).
The risks of mediation for the infringer are:
(1) Eliminates free use,
(2) Lose opportunity to invalidate or weaken the IPA, and
(3) Negotiated licensing fee may exceed trial court award (but, if a
royalty rate is awarded at trial, the infringer loses the right to future
use).
Like the intellectual property owner, the advantages/risks calculus
for the intellectual property infringer is not an exact science. The
quantification of each factor will differ depending on the infringer and
the particularities of the dispute. To add an additional complication, the
owner and the infringer may easily be forced to apply both calculi in the
same dispute. Consider two patentees both claiming infringement of
their respective patents. The plaintiff must apply the owner calculus
toward his claim, but he must also apply the infringer calculus as the
counterdefendant. The reverse is true for the defendant, for he assumes
the role of owner in the counterclaim.
C. Analyzing the Calculus Against the Nine Scenarios
An examination of the owner and infringer calculus reveals a
commonality between the owner and the infringer: each party most often
favors mediation over trial. In each calculus, the advantages of
mediation and the risks of litigation are the strongest components. In
other words, the parties’ interests are most often aligned, at least to the
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extent of whether to litigate or mediate. Of course, regardless of the
parties’ preference for mediation, the mediation cannot succeed unless
the parties share other common interests. In Section I, this article
presented the fundamental and adversarial interests as well as the nine
possible scenarios in intellectual property disputes. For illustrative
purposes, the nine scenarios are represented here in tabular form:
Parties
1. OF + NF
2. OF + N
3. O + NF
4. O + N
5. OF + NA
6. OA + NF
7. OA + N
8. O + NA
9. OA + NA

Group
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
C

The nine scenarios illustrate a dynamic feature concerning
intellectual property disputes: the parties’ interests most often align. In
Group A disputes, the parties’ interests are aligned before any
negotiation or mediation takes place. The owner is willing to allow use
for payment, and the infringer is willing to pay for use. Stated
differently, both parties are willing to enter a licensing agreement
concerning the IPA. In Group B disputes, only one of the parties is
unwilling to enter a licensing agreement before entering negotiation or
mediation. After mediation commences, all that is needed for an
agreement is for the unwilling party to shift from the adversarial interest
to the hybrid. Through reality testing and other mediation techniques,
this shift will likely occur.207
An analysis of each party’s calculus combined with an analysis of
the nine scenarios demonstrates two crucial points in evaluating
intellectual property disputes. First, each party’s calculus suggests
mediation rather than litigation for most disputes. Second, the nine
scenarios illustrate that in eight scenarios the parties’ interests align or
are likely to align. This alignment is crucial for mediation to succeed,
207. Reality testing includes consideration of the best and worst alternatives to a negotiated
agreement as well as making both parties objectively analyze their proposed solutions. See MARK
D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 63 (1996). This intriguing work
provides a step-by-step analysis of all the necessary components of a successful mediation.
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and it exists in intellectual property disputes. The parties prefer
mediation, and this mutual preference combines with the requisite
interest alignment or with a strong likelihood of interest alignment.
Intellectual property disputes are thus prime candidates for an ADR
program centered on mediation.
V. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROPOSAL
The ultimate goal of this article is to propose a sophisticated dispute
resolution program for intellectual property disputes (Proposal). The
Proposal will provide a means for efficiently resolving intellectual
property disputes through trial or ADR. Using the concepts of the
fundamental and adversarial interests, the Proposal will design proper
dispute resolution platforms for particular disputes. The Proposal
centers on the nine scenarios in intellectual property disputes. For each
scenario, a particular form of dispute resolution will best serve the needs
of the parties. Using the nine scenarios and knowledge of dispute
resolution methods, the Proposal manifests the following chart:
Parties

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

OF + NF
OF + N
O + NF
O+N
OF + NA
OA + NF
OA + N
O + NA
OA + NA

Group

A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
C

Likelihood
of
Agreement
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Very Good
Very Good
Good
Good
Poor

ADR
or
Trial
ADR
ADR
ADR
ADR
ADR
ADR
ADR
ADR
Trial

Resolution Form

Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Arb-Med
Arb-Med
Arb-Med
Arb-Med
Trial or Arbitration

The likelihood of agreement column derives statistical confirmation
from the Lanham Act Mediation Program (Program).208 The Program
generated agreements in two-thirds of all mediated disputes. The chart
lists a “Very Good” or better rating for two-thirds of the disputes and
208. See supra Section III. The author realizes one correlation does not establish statistical
certainty, but the correlation of the chart’s projections with the Program’s results shows the chart
was not generated in a completely arbitrary fashion. The hypotheses presented in this article are
substantiated to some degree by the Program’s results.
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coincides with the results of the Program.
Utilizing the chart, the Proposal will submit each dispute to trial or
an appropriate form of alternative dispute resolution. Each dispute will
be discussed in turn in the following subsections. But first, it is
important to address the issue of forcing parties to submit to binding
ADR. While there is some authority to force parties to enter nonbinding ADR,209 no authority exists to force parties to enter binding
ADR.210 Despite the arguments against forced ADR, compulsory
mediations from contractual provisions enjoy success rates as high as 50
percent.211 Nonetheless, like the Lanham Act Mediation Program, the
parties must first agree to enter the Proposal before the Proposal can take
effect.
A. Group A Disputes
In this group, the chances of an effective mediation are excellent.
Within the possible scenarios in this group, both parties are either
committed to the fundamental interest or a hybrid where the fundamental
and adversarial interests are somewhat equal. The key component is that
neither party is committed to the adversarial interest. The owner is
readily willing to allow use for payment or may be readily convinced to
allow use for payment. The infringer is readily willing to pay for use or
may be readily convinced to pay for use. The parties’ interest
commitments are aligned, and mediation will almost certainly yield a
mutual agreement. Consequently, the Proposal adopts a sophisticated
form of mandatory mediation. The mediation is mandatory, but it is
only imposed in Group A disputes where both parties are willing to enter
a licensing agreement. Thus, the Proposal resolves the debate of whether
or not to use mandatory mediation. The Proposal only uses mandatory
mediation for disputes where both parties are willing to enter a licensing
agreement.

209. In Texas, the court may force the parties in a pending dispute to ADR. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a) (Vernon 1987). See Walton v. Canon, Short & Gaston, 23
S.W.3d 143, 150 (Tex. App. 2000). Although the court can exercise this right against the parties’
will, the court may not force the parties to reach an agreement. Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247,
251 (Tex. App. 1992).
210. In some fundamental disputes, the right to have a trial is so imperative that courts refuse
to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, much less impose court-ordered ADR. Reginald B.
Henderson, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and ERISA Fiduciary Claims: The
Courts Unfortunately Declare them a Perfect Match, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27, 33-35 (2002).
211. Diane H. Banks, Paths to Mediation, with Sample Clauses, 14 UTAH B.J. 26 (2001).
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B. Group B Disputes
In this group, one party is committed to the adversarial interest.
However, mediation is still likely to yield an agreement between the
parties. If during the course of the mediation the party committed to the
adversarial interest shifts to the hybrid, a settlement will likely result.
Since the point of mediation is to facilitate such a shift, the odds are
good this shift will occur. When the other party is committed to the
fundamental interest, the odds of settlement are slightly higher, thus
justifying the “Very Good” versus the “Good” ratings. The Proposal
subjects these parties to arb-med, which invokes a hybrid form of
mandatory and voluntary mediation. The mediation is mandatory, but it
takes place after a binding arbitration decision. The parties are free to
pursue a licensing agreement in the mediation or they can stonewall the
mediation and rely solely on the arbitration award. Arb-med works
extremely well for Group B disputes because the party committed to the
adversarial interest will desire to use bluff and delay tactics against the
other party. Arb-med defeats the purpose of this strategy: the party must
decide to accept the verdict or work to reach an agreement. If the
adversarial party does not desire the binding decision, that party will
quickly shift to the hybrid during the mediation phase. If the adversarial
party wants the binding decision, the parties may forego the wasted
negotiations.
C. Group C Disputes
In this group, both parties are committed to the adversarial interest.
To reach an agreement, both parties must shift to the hybrid. While this
dual shift is possible, it is unlikely. Additionally, Group C encompasses
disputes where, although both parties are not necessarily committed to
the adversarial interest, the dispute needs to advance to trial or
arbitration. For instance, the dispute may present a novel question of
law where a precedent must be established. Mediation is not appropriate
in all cases, and this scenario is a glowing example. Between these two
parties mediation would constitute wasted time and expense. The
Proposal bypasses mediation altogether in these disputes, relying on the
court to decide whether the parties will go to trial or arbitration.
D. Determining the Parties’ Classifications
Under the Proposal, the court will have a board of mediators and
arbitrators specializing in all areas of intellectual property. Each party
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will submit an “ADR Brief” to the court, which the court will advance to
the board of mediators and arbitrators.212 The plaintiff must submit its
ADR Brief within 20 days of filing the complaint. The defendant must
submit its ADR Brief within 20 days of filing the answer. In the ADR
Brief, the parties will provide a statement of the case as well as a
summary of their proposed arguments. The parties will further provide
statements of: (1) their willingness to settle the dispute; (2) their
willingness to enter a licensing agreement; (3) their preferred form of
dispute resolution; and (4) if applicable, their reasons why the case
should proceed to trial. The court’s mediators and arbitrators will serve
on three-member panels. The panels will review the ADR Briefs and
classify the parties as committed to the fundamental interest, adversarial
interest, or the hybrid. After classifying the parties, the panel will use
the chart to refer the dispute to the appropriate format and inform the
court of the panel’s decision.
The parties will not exchange ADR Briefs. The parties will only
submit confirmation letters to each other that the ADR Brief has been
submitted. Preventing the parties from exchanging ADR Briefs will
preserve the integrity of the Proposal. If the parties exchanged ADR
Briefs, the defendant will always have the chance to abuse the process
by falsely representing its interest commitment. Moreover, both parties
will be less forthcoming in their briefs if the briefs are exchanged. The
purpose of the ADR Brief is to facilitate the panel’s decision in
classifying the dispute to efficiently resolve the dispute. If the parties
exchanged briefs, the parties would always have an incentive to present
false representations in the brief to gain a tactical advantage. However,
these false representations would only hinder an agreement and thus
injure the parties.
If the dispute falls into Group A or Group B, the court will refer the
case to mediation or arb-med as the chart dictates. Also, if both parties
indicate in their ADR Briefs that mediation is their preferred form of
dispute resolution, the panel will refer the case to mediation. The panel
may forego any review in these disputes. At this point, the Proposal will
follow typical procedures for mediation and arb-med. For mediation, the
parties will select the mediator. For arb-med, the parties will select an
arbitrator and a mediator. In arb-med sessions under the Proposal, the
arbitrator will never serve as the mediator. If the dispute falls into

212. The board of mediators and arbitrators will consist of experts in all areas of intellectual
property much like the Program’s board. See http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/legal/wdadr/ (last
visited 10/26/03).
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Group C, the panel will forward the decision to the court along with a
recommendation of whether the case should be settled through trial or
binding arbitration. The court will have the discretion to decide whether
the dispute proceeds to arbitration or litigation.
E. The Facial Inequity of Binding v. Non-Binding ADR
Under the Proposal, parties in a Group A dispute enter non-binding
ADR whereas parties in a Group B dispute enter binding ADR.
However, the Proposal does not show favoritism to parties in Group A.
Rather, the Proposal attempts to give these parties the greatest flexibility
in reaching an agreement, for they are the most likely to reach an
agreement. If the mediation is unsuccessful, the mediator will refer the
case back to the court along with an opinion of whether the case should
proceed to trial or arbitration. The court will then set the case for
resolution in the proper forum. The Proposal does not adopt the med-arb
format given the weakness of this ADR form. Mediation derives its
success from the parties’ abilities to discuss freely all aspects of the
dispute. Under med-arb, the parties have a significant incentive to hold
back information and objectives with the looming threat of binding
arbitration soon following the mediation.
Parties in Group B disputes enter arb-med to foster an agreement.
The parties enter mediation only after a final decision has been made by
the arbitrator. Once in mediation, the parties know there is an envelope
containing a decision that declares them as the winner or loser. The
mediator can use this decision as an effective tool for intense reality
testing. The parties experience the “anything can happen” feeling
described by Judge Chasanow,213 and they still have an opportunity to
settle rather than gamble on the ruling. The arb-med format fosters
agreement whereas the med-arb format stifles agreement. The Proposal
subjects all parties in Group A and Group B to the same levels of
binding and non-binding ADR, but it switches the order and timing to
foster agreement between the parties.
Also, using the arb-med format for Group B disputes will defeat a
potential abuse of process by the parties. One drawback to mediation is
that a party may falsely represent its intentions to enter mediation in
order to gain additional discovery. In other words, an OA could falsely
represent itself as an O in the ADR Brief. By doing so, the dispute
would be referred to mediation even though OA has no intention of

213. Eveleth, supra note 175, at 8.
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settling the dispute. Thus, OA could abuse the mediation process to gain
additional information about the infringer and delay the resolution
process. Arb-med alleviates this problem by creating a disincentive to
abuse the mediation process. If an OA falsely represents itself as an O, it
will first subject itself to a binding arbitration. A party committed to the
adversarial interest can gain nothing by falsely holding itself out as
committed to the hybrid.
VI. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL
The Proposal presents a sophisticated dispute resolution program
for intellectual property disputes that best serves the parties’ interests.
The parties themselves gain the most benefits from the Proposal. The
parties enjoy a more efficient, cost-effective method of resolving their
disputes. They get to avoid the hardships and mental anguish associated
with litigation. The Proposal focuses on their interests, and they have
complete power in forming the solutions. Courts benefit from the
Proposal as well by allowing mediation, arbitration, and arb-med to clear
up jam-packed dockets. The significant decrease in discovery, motion
practice, and jury selection will allow courts to divert attention to more
pressing matters. Judges can devote their efforts to intellectual property
cases presenting novel questions of law and other disputes properly
suited for trial.
The Proposal proves most challenging for attorneys. While this
article has expounded upon the perils of litigation for clients, litigation is
an attractive option for lawyers. While litigation is difficult work, it
does grant lawyers the benefit of repetition and familiarity. If every
dispute enters litigation with no possibility of ADR, the lawyer takes the
same approach for every case: file the claim or answer, undergo
discovery, contemplate settlement, engage in motion practice, and then
prepare for trial until the ever likely 11th hour settlement. For
arbitration, the preparation is quite similar. It is the mediation
component of the Proposal that mandates additional preparation by the
attorneys.
Mediation provides a number of pitfalls for which the attorney must
prepare. In mediation, the client actively participates in the resolution.
While this is great from the client’s perspective, it is nothing short of a
nightmare for attorneys. Every attorney has a war story of a client
dooming the case at some point during litigation.214 If a client can doom
214. During a clerkship, this author worked on a case where the client had allowed a default
judgment to be entered against him before he ever notified his lawyer. Countless other examples
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the case during litigation (where the client does not actively participate
in the resolution), imagine the damage the client can cause in mediation
where he speaks freely to the opposing party. Attorneys must spend
additional hours and days preparing clients for mediation, that would be
unnecessary in preparing for litigation. The attorney must prepare the
client thoroughly for everything that can be said, that cannot be said, and
the time to say it. Once in the mediation, both the attorney and client
will talk at some point. They must carefully review their strategies to
ensure they stay on the same page throughout the mediation. An
attorney using hardball tactics in the mediation may falsely impress upon
the client that the attorney is deviating from their game plan.
Moreover, a successful mediation presents danger for the attorney.
Even though the parties reach an agreement, the attorneys still must
reduce the agreement to a proper contract. While the litigators
themselves usually draft the mediation agreements, it is a good idea to
involve corporate and antitrust lawyers to finalize the agreement.215
Especially in complex litigation, a poorly drafted mediation agreement
may provide a springboard for further disputes.216 After all the
preparation and work with the client before and during the mediation,
the attorney must exercise the most caution at the conclusion of a
successful mediation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Through the use of mediation, arbitration, arb-med, and even
litigation, the Proposal sets forth a program to effectively resolve
intellectual property disputes based upon the parties’ interests.
Ironically, the Proposal imposes the most challenges upon attorneys.
Following the spirit of the law, there is no better way to design such a
sophisticated program. Law exists to govern and protect the people;
meeting their needs should always take precedence. Alleviating the
court dockets serves as a natural consequence of meeting the parties’
needs. If the judicial process is able to promote justice more efficiently,
the parties receive the benefits. By placing additional burdens on
attorneys, the Proposal meets the needs of the people and entrusts to
attorneys the responsibilities they have sworn to uphold. Attorneys for
intellectual property clients must effectively evaluate the client’s
abound and often make interesting conversations among attorneys at dinners and parties.
215. Paul R. Gupta, Settlement Agreements and IP Disputes: Practice Pointers for
Practitioners, 19 E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY 1 (2002).
216. Id.
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advantages and risks calculus to prepare the client for every form of
dispute resolution. By doing so, attorneys will assist clients in properly
formulating legal strategies to maximize the value of their IPAs. The
Proposal will allow more of these strategies to end in a sit-down with
Don Corleone rather than a costly full-scale war.
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